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Abstract 
A stable joint plan should guarantee the 
achievement of a designer's goal in a multi­
agent environment, while ensuring that de­
viations from the prescribed plan would be 
detected. We present a computational frame­
work where stable joint plans can be studied, 
as well as several basic results about the rep­
resentation, verification and synthesis of sta­
ble joint plans. 
1 Introduction 
Stable behavior is central to decision-making in multi­
agent environments. There are several forms of sta­
bility which have been discussed in the literature. In 
some cases stability refers to rationality in multi-agent 
encounters. A stable rational behavior (aka. Nash­
equilibrium (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991)) is a joint be­
havior of the agents, such that it is irrational for each 
of the agents to deviate from it, assuming the other 
agents stick to their part of that behavior. Other types 
of stability aim to optimize the behavior of one party 
(e.g., a designer, the government (Kreps 1990)) assum­
ing the other parties are rational. In addition, work in 
control-theory (Ramadge & Wonham 1989), and work 
in distributed systems (Dwork & Moses 1990), have 
faced a different, although somewhat related, types of 
stability, where we wish a system to behave in a robust 
manner in face of machine failures. 
A major theme of the above-mentioned lines of re­
search is the interest in systems where deviations from 
a prescribed behavior are either irrational, impossible, 
or do not affect the overall activity of the system. Un­
fortunately, in many situations this stability can not 
be obtained. For example, it might be unreasonable 
to assume that goals can be obtained given arbitrary 
types of machine failures. 
In this paper we discuss a basic multi-agent setting, 
where the designer's objective is to devise a joint plan 
for a group of agents in order to obtain a desired goal. 
The basic objective is that the goal will be obtained 
whenever the agents follow the prescribed plan. How­
ever, a major additional requirement is that if an agent 
deviates from the joint plan then this deviation should 
be detected by the other agents. This is especially im­
portant if this deviation leads to a situation where the 
designer's goal is not obtained. Hence, assuming we 
have a pair of agents, each of which might observe 
only part of the other agent's states and actions, and 
given that the designer's goal is composed of particu­
lar states to be reached by both agents, the designer's 
aim would be to devise a stable joint plan. In a stable 
joint plan, a deviation by one of the agents will be de­
tected by the other agent. The designer can then be 
informed about that deviation. 
One can easily observe that the above-mentioned form 
of stability is useful for many settings. In the case 
where agents might deviate from their plans due to 
machine failures, stability may enable the designer to 
detect that the system operates in an unsatisfactory 
manner. In the case of rational agents, where an agent 
might maliciously deviate from a suggested joint plan, 
stability may prevent deviations by enabling the use 
of punishment mechanisms (for which the detection of 
deviations is crucial) (Brafman & Tennenholtz 1996). 
In most of this paper our interpretation to stability 
is in the flavor of mechanism design in Game The­
ory (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991; Myerson 1991). In a 
mechanism design problem a designer, who has her 
own preferences and desires, has to devise an appro­
priate behavior (e.g., joint plan) to a group of agents. 
However, the agents might deviate from prescribed be­
haviors that are irrational for them. Rationality (and, 
respectively, irrationality) is captured in game theory 
by the concept of equilibria. In an equilibrium, a devi­
ation by an agent is irrational since it will not increase 
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its payoff/utility, given that the other agents would 
stick to their prescribed behavior. The related Game­
Theoretic notions assume that the utility functions of 
the agents are common-knowledge (or, in more elabo­
rated settings, that there exists a probability distribu­
tion on the utility functions which is common knowl­
edge). This is a point that we wish to relax in this pa­
per. In order to handle this we use the following idea. 
Each agent is required to execute a particular plan and 
to notify the designer about any deviation from pre­
scribed plans that it observes. Assuming the designer 
has the power to "punish" a deviating agent, no devi­
ations that are to be exposed are rational. Hence, our 
notion of equilibria will be a qualitative one. The aim 
of the designer is to devise a plan that will guarantee 
that her goal will be obtained and that will be stable 
against any possible deviation: any deviation from a 
prescribed plan which will prevent the achievement of 
the designer's goal will lead the deviating agent to a 
low payoff since that deviation will be detected by the 
other agents and will lead to a proper punishment. 
In order to illustrate the above-mentioned problem and 
approach consider a pair of robots, controlled by differ­
ent programmers, which are about to work in a shared 
environment. The designer may require the robots to 
perform a particular task, and may wish to ensure that 
this task is actually performed. She will then devise 
a plan for performing that task that is stable against 
deviations by any single agent. This plan will have 
the property that any deviation by an agent which will 
prevent goal achievement will be detected by the other 
agent. If robot 1 (i.e., its programmer) decides to use 
a track that is different from the track prescribed to it 
by the designer's plan and this deviation prevents the 
achievement of the designer's goal, stability will ensure 
that this deviation will be detected and announced by 
robot 2, which will cause an appropriate reaction by 
the designer. 
In the following sections we present a computational 
setting where stable joint plans can be studied, as well 
as several results about the representation, verifica­
tion, and synthesis of stable joint plans. We start with 
a basic computational setting, where uncertainty is a 
result of potential deviations from prescribed behav­
iors. In a later point, we extend the discussion to the 
case where there is incomplete information about the 
environment behavior, in addition to the potential de­
viations by the agents. Most of our computational 
study refers to moderate settings, where the number 
of states in the system is taken to be polynomial in 
the actual representation size. This is done in order to 
concentrate on the issue of stability, rather than tackle 
the general intractability of planning in (even simple) 
non-moderate settings. 1 
2 The Computational Setting 
Definition 2.1: 
Let S = (5t, 52, B, At, A2, T} be a system. A sys­
tem consists of a pair of agents,2 where agent i is 
associated with a set of states 5;, and with a set 
of actions A;, and B is a set of environment states. 
T : St X 52 X B X At X A2 ---+ St X s2 X B is a state 
transition function. Let c = St X s2 X B denote the 
set of system configurations. 
A system consists of a pair of agents, each of which 
has its own states and actions. At each point, each 
agent can observe only its state. In addition, there is 
another component to the system, that we refer to as 
the system environment, which has its own state. The 
system is initialized in an initial configuration c0 E C. 
A goal for the system is a set of configurations C9 s; C. 
A plan for agent i is a sequence of actions.3 Given 
an initial configuration Co and a goal Cr;. we say that 
the joint plan P = (P1, P2) (where P; is the plan for 
agent i) is efficient if P leads from co to an element 
c9 E C9 and no more than ICI actions are executed in 
the course of P; (i = 1, 2). 
A goal is obtained when a configuration c9 E C9 is 
reached. Notice that an agent can not in general de­
duce from its state that a goal configuration has been 
reached. This point is a major motivation for our 
study. If the achievement of a goal could be deduced 
from the state of a single agent then this agent could 
easily detect deviations by the other agent which pre­
vent goal achievement. Unfortunately, this is usually 
not the case. A goal can be a composite goal which 
requires each of the agents to reach a particular state. 
For example, one agent may be required to reach a 
location l1 while the other agent may be required to 
reach a location l2; the fact that the first agent has 
reached l1 need not necessarily guarantee that the sec­
ond agent has reached l2. Similarly, the agents may 
need to perform certain actions which will bring the 
environment to a particular state. However, when 
reaching an appropriate goal state, the state of an 
agent might not contain enough information to guar� 
antee that the goal has been actually obtained. 
1 See however Section 7 where crash failures in non­
moderate settings are discussed. 
20ur discussion and results can be easily extended to 
the case where the number of agents is a constant c, where 
c > 2. -
3In a later point, when we discuss incomplete informa­
tion about the environment behavior, we will be interested 
in a more complicated type of plans. 
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The model we have defined is a general model for 
multi-agent environments. Consider the robots men­
tioned in the introduction. In order to be more con­
crete assume that the robots (i.e., agents) move in a 
grid-like environment such as those found in assembly 
plants or in a warehouse (see (Shoham & Tennenholtz 
1995) for a more detailed discussion). At each point 
in time each robot can either stay in its place or move 
to one of its neighboring coordinates. When a robot 
is in a particular coordinate, it can see every coordi­
nate which is in a distance of one coordinate from it. 
In general, rows and columns of the grid correspond 
to lanes, while the rest of space is devoted to equip­
ment and material the robots may need to use. The 
designer may require the robots to move along particu­
lar paths and carry different items from place to place. 
The state of each robot represents its location and ob­
servations in a particular point, and the environment 
state can refer to additional information such as the 
location of particular tools. Notice that the knowl­
edge of an agent about its environment need not be 
explicitly represented as part of its state. An agent's 
state of knowledge is generated based on its history of 
observations and actions, and its background knowl­
edge about the system and the plans to be executed 
by the agents. The actions taken by the agent may 
change the agents' state and the environment state. As 
the reader can see our model can represent in a quite 
straightforward manner situations as the one men­
tioned above. The semantics of our model follows the 
general semantics for distributed systems discussed in 
(Fagin et al. 1995), and its more concrete details and 
their use are discussed in (Moses & Tennenholtz 1995; 
Safra & Tennenholtz 1994). 
Our basic assumption is that the structure of S, as well 
as the identity of co and C9, are common-knowledge. 
This point will be relaxed in Section 6. Once a joint 
plan has been prescribed to the agents, it becomes 
common-knowledge as well. However, after the system 
has been initialized, each agent can observe only its 
states. Naturally, an agent may deduce, based on its 
observations and initial knowledge, some facts about 
the other agent's state or actions. 
It is easy to see that if there is a joint plan leading from 
the initial configuration to a goal configuration, then 
there is also an efficient joint plan which obtains the 
desired goal. In fact, the computation of an efficient 
joint plan is a simple graph search (Aho, Hopcroft, 
& Ullman 1974). This refers to the case where the 
agents stick to the prescribed behavior. In our setting, 
however, an agent might deviate from that behavior. 
This leads to the definition of stable joint plans. 
Definition 2.2: 
Given a system S, an initial configuration co, and a 
goal Cg, a joint plan P :::: (P1, P2) for the agents is 
stable if the following hold: 
1. P is efficient. 
2. If agent i deviates from P; while the other agent 
(j) sticks to Pj, and Cg is not reached (by the 
corresponding joint plan), then this deviation will 
be detected4 by j (for i:::: 1, 2, and j =f i). 
In the following sections we study several computa­
tional aspects of stable joint plans. In particular, we 
will consider the verification of stability, as well as the 
synthesis of stable joint plans. 
3 The Verification of Stability 
The verification that a joint plan achieves a desired 
goal is easy. However, in order to have a stable joint 
plan, we need to ensure that deviations which prevent 
goal achievement would be detected. 
Given a joint plan, we wish to verify whether agent 1 
can detect deviations by agent 2 (while agent 1 follows 
its plan). The case where agent 2 detects deviations 
by agent 1 is treated similarly. 
We now present a polynomial algorithm for the verifi­
cation that a deviation by agent 2, which prevents goal 
achievement, will be detected by agent 1. The input 
of the algorithm is a system and an efficient joint plan 
P ;;;;;; (Pt, P2) leading from the initial configuration of 
the system to a goal configuration. Notice that, in gen­
eral, the agents need not halt when arriving at a goal 
configuration cg. In the sequel, we assume that the 
number of configurations and actions is polynomial in 
the actual representation size. 
Let t ::; ICI be the length of P (i.e., the total number of 
actions executed in the course of P). Let C' == C x N, 
where N is a set of time stamps; the range of N is 
between 0 and t. 
The Detection Algorithm: 
1. Mark as "good" all elements of C' which corre­
spond to time t, in which the state of agent 1 is 
as prescribed by the joint plan (i.e., as it should 
be by the end of P's execution). 
4We require the detection of the fact a deviation has 
occurred. We do not require a. detection of the exact nature 
of this deviation. 
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2. Mark as "good" each element ci == (c1, k) E C', 
for which the following conditions hold: 
• The state of agent 1 in c1 is as the state it 
should be in when the time is k (when both 
agents conform to the joint plan). 
• The joint plan specifies an action a E A11 
such that when augmented with some action 
b E A2 (which may be the action prescribed 
by the plan, but might be an action which 
deviates from the plan) will lead from c1 to 
an element c2 where c� = (c2, k+l) is already 
marked as "good". 
3. If (co, 0) is marked as "good" and a path of length 
t which passes only through "good" elements but 
not through Cg exists, then return failure (a de­
viation is possible). Otherwise, go back to 2. If 
there is a round in which no new element has been 
marked as "good", then return success (no devia­
tion is possible). 
Theorem 3.1: 
The detection algorithm is polynomial, and announces 
success if and only if no deviation is possible. 
4 Eventual Detection of Deviations 
In the previous section we have shown a polynomial 
algorithm for the verification that a given joint plan is 
stable. In the setting studied in the previous section, 
the number of configurations is taken to be polyno­
mial in the actual representation size, and agents have 
complete information about the environment behavior. 
All the uncertainty in the system is a result of devi­
ations made by the agents. These facts, augmented 
with the positive result obtained in the previous sec­
tion, suggest one may wish to consider the feasibility 
of an automatic synthesis of stable joint plans. 
Definition 4.1 : (The stable joint plan prob­
lem](SJPP): Given a systemS, an initial configuration 
c0, and a goal Cg, find a stable joint plan, if exists, and 
otherwise announce that no such plan exists. 
As the following theorem shows, the automatic synthe­
sis of stable joint plans is intractable. The reduction 
used in the proof of the following theorem sheds light 
on the structure of stable joint plans. It shows that 
deviations might lead to situations where the designer 
might need to solve constraint satisfaction problems 
in order to enable one agent to distinguish between 
deviations and proper behavior of the other agent. 
Theorem 4.2: 
The SJPP is NP-complete. 
Proof: (Sketch): 
We prove the theorem by reduction from 3-SAT. Let 
cp be a 3-CNF formula, where C1, C2, ... , Cm are the 
clauses in cp. The set of primitive propositions is X := 
{xt,X2, . . .  , xn} · For every i (1 SiS m) , clause i 
consists of three literals l;1, l;, and l;3, where each lii 
is a primitive proposition or its negation. 
We take the environment to have a unique state 
(hence, this state is fixed and cannot be changed, 
and we need not refer to it in the transition func­
tion). The goal Cg will contain only one element. 
We have two agents. Agent 1 has n + 4 states: 
so, s1. • • •  , sn, Sn+l• p, q, where so is the initial state 
of agent 1, and s1 is the part of the goal asso­
ciated with agent 1. Agent 2 has m + 3 states: 
ro, rg, rh r2, ... , rm, o, where r0 is the initial state of 
agent 2, and r g is the part of the goal associated with 
agent 2. 
Agent 1 can perform the following actions. In the ini­
tial state it can perform only the action a, while in 
s;(l S i :::;: n) it can perform only the actions x; and 
-.x;, which are associated with the corresponding lit­
erals. In Sn+l agent 1 can perform only the action 
observe. In p and q the agent can not perform any 
action (or, alternatively, it can perform only the null 
action). 
Agent 2 can perform the following actions. In the ini­
tial state it can perform actions d, db d2, ... , dm. In 
all other states agent 2 can perform only the null (no) 
action. 
It remains to define the transition function. The joint 
action (a, d) will lead from the initial configuration to 
the goal configuration, and a will always lead from so 
to s1• Each action of the form x; or -,x; will lead from 
the corresponding s; to Si+l· The effects of observe in 
Sn+l will be as follows: observe will lead to p if and 
only if agent 2 is not in o; if agent 2 is in o then the 
state q will be reached. 
By performing d; agent 2 will move from r0 tor;. Any 
action which corresponds to a literal in the j's clause 
will move agent 2 from r3 to o. 
Now, if there exists a satisfying assignment, then by 
choosing the plan which corresponds to it as the plan 
for the first agent, and requesting agent 2 to perform d 
as its first action, we will guarantee the desired stable 
plan. This is due to the fact that we will reach the 
state o in a case of a deviation by agent 2 (and re­
gardless of the nature of that deviation). On the other 
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hand, if there is a stable plan then we must ensure 
that agent 2 will reach either its goal state or the state 
o. Otherwise, agent 1 will not be able to distinguish 
between deviations and goal achievements. In order to 
do so, agent 1 must choose a satisfying literal for each 
of the clauses. In addition, it can not choose a literal 
and its negation by the construction {of agent 1). This 
yields the desired result. I 
5 Fast Detection of Deviations 
The negative result obtained in the previous section 
suggests one may wish to consider modifications and 
restrictions of our basic setting, which may make the 
synthesis problem tractable. One interesting modifi­
cation of the synthesis problem is discussed below. 
Stable joint plans should enable the detection of devi­
ations. In many realistic systems, however, eventual 
detection of deviations is not satisfactory. In partic­
ular, deviations might cause various kinds of damage; 
the faster these deviations are detected, the better the 
system would work. For example, in our robotics set­
ting, when a robot takes a track which is different from 
the one prescribed by the designer, it may lead to con­
flicts with other tasks that are under the designer's 
control (e.g., the maintenance of a particular machine); 
hence, a fast detection of the corresponding deviation 
might become crucial. This suggests that deviations 
should be detected as fast as possible, and leads to the 
following definition. 
Definition 5.1: 
Let k be an integer. Given a system S, an initial con­
figuration co, and a goal Cg, a joint plan P =(PI> P2) 
is k-stable if the following hold: 
1. P is an efficient joint plan leading from C0 to C9• 
2. A deviation from P; (i = 1, 2) at time m, will 
be detected by agent j ::ft i no later than at time 
m+k+l. 
In order to handle k-stable plans we will use the fol­
lowing construction. Let C' = C X T, where T de­
notes the non-negative integers between 0 and ICI. 
Let P(c') denote the set of available joint plans in 
configuration c'5 , which are of length k + 1. Define 
C = {(t,c',p(c')): t E T,c' E C,p(c') E P(c')}. Let 
Ct = (tt,c',p(c')), and c2 = (t2,c",p(c")). We say that 
c2 E C is reachable from c1 E C if the following hold: 
5Recall that a plan for an agent in this case is simply a 
sequence of actions; there is no a-priori requirement that 
it should reach a particular state. 
2. The first joint action in p( c') leads from c1 to c". 
3. The k last actions in p(c') coincide with the k first 
actions in p(c11). 
4. A deviation by one of the agents from its part of 
the first joint action,6 will be detected while the 
other agent performs its k following actions. 
Notice that the number of elements in C is polyno­
mial in ICI, and that points (1),(2) and (3) are easy 
to check. Point ( 4) can be verified as follows. Let 
c" = (b, s1, s2), and for simplicity consider the case 
where agent 1 is the deviating agent. We enumerate 
all possible plans of length k + 1 of agent 1, which may 
be initialized in c'. If there exists such a plan which, 
when executed in parallel to the plan prescribed to 
agent 2 by p(c'), leads in the first step to (b',s',s2) 
(where s1 ::ft St or b1 ::ft b), and on the following steps 
agent 2 will visit the same states as it would visit when 
the agents follow p(c'), then there exists a deviation 
which can not be detected. If no such plan has been 
found then every deviation will be detected. Notice 
that the verification of point (4) is polynomial. 
We denote the set of pairs (ell c2) E C2, where c2 is 
reachable from c11 by E(C). 
Consider now the following stable joint plan algorithm 
[SJPA], which relies on the previous definition and al­
gorithm for the generation of C and E(C). 
1. Denote by "good" all elements of C, for which 
the first joint action specified in the corresponding 
joint plan (of length k + 1) leads to the goal, and 
any deviation by one of the agents from that joint 
action will be detected in the following k steps (as 
in (4) above), 
2. Search for an element (ct. c2) E E(C), where c2 is 
denoted by "good" and c1 is still not marked as 
"good" . If such an element has been found, then 
denote c1 by "good" and go back to 2. 
3. If an element c which is associated with the ini­
tial configuration has been marked as "good" then 
return "success"; otherwise, return "failure". 
Theorem 5.2: 
SJPA is polynomial, and generates a k-stable joint 
plan iff such a plan exists. 
6Such a deviation should lead to a configuration which 
differs from the configuration obtained if both agents obey 
the prescribed joint plan. 
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6 Uncertainty and Incomplete 
Information 
We have discussed stable joint plans in the context 
of settings where uncertainty is a result of (malicious 
or non-malicious) deviations from a prescribed behav­
ior. Uncertainty about the environment state has been 
a direct consequence of the potential deviations. In 
this section we wish to relax this assumption. This is 
obtained by removing the assumption that the initial 
configuration co is common-knowledge. In the rest of 
this paper we assume that there is a set Co t; C of 
possible initial configurations. The system may be ini­
tiated in any configuration c0 E Co, but the identity 
of the actual initial configuration is initially unknown. 
We assume that the agents are able to initially com­
municate about their initial states, but the initial en­
vironment state is unknown and may be any bo E B 
which is consistent with the agents' knowledge about 
Co and their initial states (our discussion and results 
hold also for the case where the agents are not able to 
communicate about their initial states). 
The above-mentioned setting is a general setting for 
planning with incomplete information. The idea of in­
troducing incomplete information by presenting lack 
of knowledge about the initial configuration is stan­
dard in game theory. For example, in our robotics 
example, it might be a-priori unknown whether a par­
ticular movement turns on machine 1 or machine 2. 
This incomplete information may be expressed by the 
environment state. The effects of the different actions 
is a function of the environment state, and by having 
incomplete information about the initial environment 
state we can capture uncertainty about the effects of 
actions, as well as other types of uncertainty (e.g., un­
certainty about the actual state of the environment). 
Notice that although the state of the environment is 
initially unknown, the agents may learn about the 
state of the environment based on their observations. 
A plan for an agent operating in a setting with in­
complete information is a decision tree where at each 
node a decision about the action to be performed is 
made based on the recent observation (i.e., state which 
has been reached). This is a standard description of 
conditional plans (Safra & Tennenholtz 1994). Notice 
that this representation makes the action-selection to 
depend on the agent's history of observations and ac­
tions. In particular, an agent i may reach a states E Si 
twice during the course of its plan, select an action a 
in its first arrival at s, and select an action b ;f. a in its 
second arrival at s. This is due to the fact the state s 
refers to an observable state of the agent, rather than 
to its complete knowledge state which is built based 
on its history of observations and actions. We will say 
that a joint plan is efficient if it guarantees the achieve­
ment of the desired goal for any possible c E C0, while 
the number of actions which might be executed in a 
course of the plan is bounded by IStl X IS2I X lEI. A 
major point to notice is that efficient plans in this con­
text might, in principle, be exponentially large. This 
crucial point is discussed in detail below. 
The reader should notice that although we assume we 
can list the set of possible environment states, the 
problem of coming up with a satisfactory plan might 
be quite problematic even when we have a single agent. 
This is due to the fact that a plan in this case may 
become a decision tree of exponential size. Indeed, 
as Safra and Tennenholtz have shown (Safra & Ten­
nenholtz 1994) the problem of coming up with a plan 
which will guarantee goal achievement in the single­
agent case is NP-hard. Fortunately, they have also 
shown that if there is a plan leading to the desired goal, 
then there is such a plan which can be represented in 
polynomial space and be verified in polynomial time. 
We now extend the above-mentioned positive result to 
the case of a pair of agents which operate with incom­
plete information about the environment, where plans 
are required to be also stable. 
Theorem 6.1: 
Given a system with incomplete information, if a sta­
ble joint plan exists, then there is such a plan that can 
be encoded in polynomial space and be verified in poly­
nomial time. 
The proof of the above theorem is omitted from this 
abstract. It follows the proof by Safra and Tennenholtz 
for the single-agent case (Safra & Tennenholtz 1994). 
We wish to emphasize that this result, when aug­
mented with the result presented in Section 4, shows 
the importance of plan-des'ign processes for the con­
struction of stable joint plans. More specifically, we 
have shown that the synthesis of stable joint plans is 
intractable even when there is no uncertainty about 
the environment state. In fact, the proof of Theo­
rem 4.2 has taken the environment state to be fixed. 
However, an off-line construction of a stable joint plan 
by a trial and error procedure may become feasible, 
due to the fact that stable joint plans can be efficiently 
represented and verified. The latter holds even for set­
tings where uncertainty about the environment state 
does exist (in addition to the potential agent devia­
tions). Assume that in our robotics example the de­
signer can enumerate the set of relevant environment 
states, although she may not be able to a-priori know 
what the actual initial configuration is. The designer 
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may wish to equip the robots with a joint plan which 
will guarantee the achievement of her goal, and that 
will be stable. Our result supplies the designer with a 
guarantee that if an appropriate stable joint plan ex­
ists then it can be encoded efficiently. Moreover, when 
a candidate for an appropriate plan is suggested, the 
verification of whether it is satisfactory or where it fails 
can be carried out efficiently. This enables the use of 
a trial and error procedure for the generation of the 
desired plan. 
7 Non-Moderate Settings 
Until this point we have assumed that our systems 
are moderate. In a moderate system, the number of 
possible configurations is taken to be polynomial in 
the actual representation size (or, alternatively, we 
measure complexity as a function of the number of 
configurations). Notice that this restriction does not 
imply that the number of knowledge states that an 
agent may reach is small (see (Fagin et al. 1995; 
Safra & Tennenholtz 1994; Moses & Tennenholtz 
1995)). In particular, the latter might be exponen­
tially larger than the number of agent's states. Hence, 
moderate settings are still an appealing and non-trivial 
context. 
Consider now a non-moderate setting of incomplete 
information. We still assume that the number of en­
vironment states is polynomial in the actual represen­
tation size, but we assume that the number of agents' 
states might be exponential in the actual representa­
tion size. For example, one may consider a situation 
where the state of an agent is described by a set of 
n primitive propositions. In the latter case we may 
wish to consider representations which are polynomial 
in n (and therefore the number of agents' states in 
this case is exponential in the actual representation 
size). In non-moderate settings it makes no sense to 
associate efficiency with the achievement of a goal in 
IBI X IS1I x IS2I steps, since this value might be ex­
ponential in the actual representation size. Hence, we 
will be interested in plans where the number of ac­
tions which might be executed in a course of a plan is 
polynomial in the actual representation size. 
When we have exponentially many states then even 
single agent planning with complete information and 
without any possible deviation becomes intractable. It 
is easy to check that this implies that the verification 
that a given joint plan is stable is intractable in this 
case. However, we now show a common class of non­
moderate settings of incomplete information, where 
the representation and verification of stable joint plans 
can be carried out efficiently. 
Crash failures are deviations in which an agent might 
suddenly fail, and stay in that situation from that 
point on (Dwork & Moses 1990; Moses & Tennenholtz 
1995). When an agent crashes, it starts to repeatedly 
execute a distinguished action, "null". The effects of 
"null" on the system behavior will be determined by 
the transition function. 
Theorem 7.1: Consider a non-moderate system with 
incomplete information, and assume that all possible 
deviations are crash failures. If a stable joint plan ex­
ists, then there is such a plan which can be encoded in 
polynomial space and be verified in polynomial time. 
8 Discussion 
In this paper we have introduced a computational 
study of stable joint plans. The aim of stable joint 
plans is to enable goal achievement, while detecting 
deviations which might prevent the achievement of the 
desired goal. This type of stability is useful for a vari­
ety of multi-agent settings. In particular, it enables a 
designer to obtain a desired goal, while ensuring that 
if the goal has not been obtained due to a deviation 
by one of the agents, then she would be announced 
about that by the other agent. In the case of malicious 
failures, stability is a major tool in the prevention of 
deviations. 
On the conceptual level, in this paper we have intro­
duced a qualitative form of mechanism design. Work 
on multi-agent systems in AI has adopted the Game­
Theoretic mechanism design approach (Rosenschein & 
Zlotkin 1994; Kraus & Wilkenfeld 1991; Sandholm & 
Lesser 1995). However, the related Game� Theory lit­
erature has made strong assumptions about the knowl­
edge available to the agents. At first glance, it might 
be somewhat unclear whether useful mechanisms can 
be devised without such knowledge. Our work sug­
gests a qualitative mechanism, which does no rely on 
classical assumptions on the agents' utility functions, 
but relies on the assumption that a designer has the 
power for punishing a deviating agent. As in classical 
mechanism design the designer wishes to obtain her 
goal, but in the lack of knowledge about the objec­
tives of agents she would devise a joint plan that will 
lead to the detection of deviations. Given the ability 
to punish deviating agents, we get a qualitative sta­
bility concept in which the designer's goal is obtained 
and no deviations are rational. 
On the more technical level our work extends results 
obtained for single-agent planning with incomplete in­
formation to the multi-agent case. Previous work has 
shown that off-line design processes are useful in the 
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context of single-agent planning with incomplete in­
formation. In particular, single-agent planning with 
incomplete information is intractable in moderate set­
tings, and it is off-line tractable (i.e., the corresponding 
plans can be efficiently represented and verified) even 
in quasi-moderate settings (i.e., when the number of 
environment states is polynomial but the number of 
agents' states might be exponentially large). Our work 
reveals similar phenomena in the multi-agent context. 
In this context, incomplete information is replaced or 
augmented with potential deviations by the agents. In 
this case we show that in moderate settings, the exis­
tence of potential deviations (while we have complete 
information about the environment) suffices to make 
the generation of stable plans intractable, while the re­
lated problem is off-line tractable even if the potential 
deviations are augmented with incomplete information 
about the environment state. 
Most of our study refers to moderate settings where 
the number of configurations is polynomial in the ac­
tual representation size. While it not our aim to advo­
cate moderate representations, we wish to make clear 
the distinction between these representations and ex­
haustive representations of the agents' state space. 
The state of an agent in our setting refers to the phys­
ical/observable state of an agent, and not to its more 
general mental/local/knowledge state. The knowledge 
state of the agent is built incrementally and implicitly 
as a function of the agent's observations and actions. 
Notice that the number of knowledge states is expo­
nentially larger than the number of agent's states to be 
actually represented. This is in fact the situated au­
tomata idea (Rosenschein 1985). Notice that our com­
plexity results refers to the number of an agent's ob­
servable states rather than to the exponentially larger 
number of its mental/local/knowledge states. Need­
less to say, it may be of interest to consider in future 
work more succinct representations, where the num­
ber of observable states is exponential in the actual 
representations size. 
We see the mixture of the qualitative approach to de­
sign with the more classical approach to mechanism 
design as a promising research direction. In particular, 
some knowledge about the utility function of agents 
may be available or deduced during plan execution, 
and may be integrated into the corresponding algo­
rithms and enable the generation of better plans. The 
mixture of various kinds of failures, e.g., crash fail­
ures and rational malicious failures, would also require 
non-trivial adjustments to the related setting. In ad­
dition, although stable joint plans prevent deviations 
by rational agents, they do not fix deviations which 
are non-maliciously caused by agents who may wish 
to conform to suggested plans. The need to fix such 
deviations may be a subject for further study. We 
hope to address these topics in future work. 
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